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Available online xxxxDespite some recent progress, scenario planning's development as an academic discipline remains constrained
by the perception it is solely a practical tool for thinking about the future, with limited theoretical foundations.
The paper addresses this issue by showing that G. L. S. Shackle's ‘Potential Surprise Theory’ (PST) contains
much that can lend theoretical support to scenario planning - especially its use of plausibility rather than prob-
ability, and its focus on potential extreme outcomes. Moreover, PST and scenario planning share the same ontol-
ogy, viewing the future as constructed by the imagination of individuals. Yet, under PST, while the future is
imagined and, therefore, subjective, individuals nevertheless seek to identify the ‘best’ option through a deduc-
tive process of elimination. PST therefore assists in overcoming the divide between the constructivist and
deductivist perspectives in scenario planning as it employs both. Finally, the paper shows that theoretically un-
derpinning scenario planning with PST would place it at the heart of contemporary debates on decision making
under uncertainty taking place in economics and other ﬁelds, enhancing its status and proﬁle as a discipline.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Scenario planning is a tool for considering the future that is widely
used by business and government (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014,
p.215; Evans, 2011, p.461; Chermack and Swanson, 2008;
Weimer-Jehle, 2006, p.335; Bowman, 2015, p.79; Bradﬁeld et al.,
2005). Yet, despite this, scenario planning has not yet become a fully-
developed academic discipline. One reason is argued to be the percep-
tion that, despite recent efforts to provide it with a more solid theoret-
ical underpinning, scenario planning remains a practical tool with
limited theoretical foundations (Dragos Aligica, 2005;Wilkinson, 2009).
Chermack, some time ago, commented that ‘the status of theory de-
velopment in the area of scenario planning is dismal’ (Chermack, 2002,
p.25) and that there is insufﬁcient development of theory to support the
‘fast growing’ practice of scenario planning (Chermack, 2005, p.60).
However, some progress has been made in addressing this issue in re-
cent years - for example, by Phadnis et al. (Phadnis et al., 2014), who
have recently set out an explicit set of theoretical axioms for scenario
planning in this journal. Similarly, a number of augmentations to the
‘standard’ Intuitive Logics' (IL) approach to scenario planning have
been set out in the recent literature, and the case formaking these adap-
tations has drawn on theoretical discussions related to, for example,
structuration theory (MacKay and Tambeau, 2013), indeterminism
(Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; Wright et al., 2013; Wright and
Goodwin, 2009) and complexity theory (Wilkinson et al., 2013),This is an open access article under t
tial surprise theory as a theor
2016.05.008thereby adding more theoretical ﬂesh to the practical scenario-
planning process. Yet, despite this, it is still widely held, including by
those having carried out what theoretical work does exist, that scenario
planning remains underdeveloped theoretically. For example, Phadnis
et al. (Phadnis et al., 2014) state that there remains a ‘lack of theoretical
grounding’ for scenario planning, and Bowman (Bowman, 2015, p.79),
writing very recently, implies the same.
Bradﬁeld (Bradﬁeld, 2008) suggests that this ‘lack of theoretical
grounding’ has come about because the growth in popularity of scenar-
ios has happened for practical rather than theoretical reasons. Godet
(Godet, 1990) similarly states that ‘theoretical research and sophisticat-
ed tools have been neglected in favour of multiple applications’ and
Bowman (Bowman, 2015) notes that ‘an absence of theoretical belong-
ing has left scenario-based approaches drifting between a multitude of
frameworks’. The implication in each instance is that scenario planning
requires more solid theoretical foundations to rectify this issue. Indeed,
Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962), in hiswork on the evolution of scientiﬁc paradigms,
showed that a lack of commonality in terms of practical approaches, as
is evident in relation to scenario planning (Bowman, 2015), is an indica-
tor of a discipline that remains in theoretical ﬂux and is yet to coalesce
around a commonly-agreed theoretical standpoint. When the latter ﬁ-
nally occurs, the discipline stabilises and proliferation of practical
methods is reduced, for a time at least. Scenario planning has not yet
reached this stage and the expectation is that a clearer theoretical un-
derpinning is needed for it to do so (Dragos Aligica, 2005). Rather
than a set of rigid axioms, this theorywould likely consist of a set of gen-
erally agreed-upon over-arching principles that guide the implementa-
tion of scenario planning as it is tailored to suit the particular context inhe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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main, reﬂecting themanifold contexts in which scenario planning is ap-
plied, these over-arching principles would be the common thread that
joins them together.
Yet, theoretical frameworks that could potentially fulﬁl this role have
already, from time-to-time, been identiﬁed, only to remain undeveloped
and, eventually, forgotten. For example, Loasby (Loasby, 2011) has re-
cently noted that as long ago as the 1980s scenario planners working at
Royal Dutch Shell recognised the similarity between the non-orthodox
economist G. L. S. Shackle's theory of ‘potential surprise’ (Shackle, 1938,
1943, 1945, 1949a,b,c,d, 1950–1951, 1952, 1953, 1955a,b, 1958, 1959,
1961, 1967, 1970, 1972, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984; Earl and Littleboy,
2014) and scenario planning. Shackle himself also recognised the similar-
ity, as evidenced by private correspondence to Shell's then Chief Econo-
mist, Michael Jefferson (Jefferson, 2014, p.210), in which Shackle refers
to the ‘essential unity’ between his ideas and scenario planning as then
practiced at Shell. However, subsequent to highlighting this fact, Jefferson
goes on to note (Jefferson, 2014) that ‘as I look [today] at the 30 or so
books on my shelves focussed on scenarios…not one refers to George
Shackle’. Shackle's extensive corpus of work, then, is a prime example
of a potential theoretical framework for scenario planning which has
gone undeveloped and largely overlooked by scenario planning scholars.
Those researching within the ﬁeld continue to bemoan scenario
planning's limited theoretical foundations, not realising that a theoretical
framework capable of lending strong support to scenario planning has
been in existence for many decades already.
As this paper will show, the failure to develop the link between
Shackle and scenario planning is a signiﬁcant oversight. The connection
between Shackle's theoretical ideas and the practical tool that is scenar-
io planning is, if not one of 'essential unity' as Shackle put it, then at least
one of considerable consilience. It is sufﬁcient, at least, for Shackle's
theorising to contribute signiﬁcantly to the creation of a theory of sce-
nario planning, and, potentially, it is adequate to form the central
plank of such a theory. In short, Shackle's PST can potentially provide
a signiﬁcant part of the theoretical backboneneeded to frame discussion
on scenario planning, facilitating its stabilisation and development as an
academic discipline, and assisting in reducing the current proliferation
of practical approaches. This potential, however, requires consideration
and discussion among scenario planning scholars, which this paper
aims to stimulate.
In this vein, Shackle's ideas are particularly salient to recent (and
long-running) debates on the use of plausibility compared to probabil-
ity in scenario planning (Ramirez and Selin, 2014; Millett, 2009). As
practiced at Shell, scenario planning exclusively employed plausibility
(Jefferson, 2012) and this was a primary reason for the ‘essential
unity’ Shackle identiﬁed between PST and scenario planning. PST pro-
vides a detailed theoretical justiﬁcation for the use of plausibility; it
also provides a theoretical bolster to justify scenario planning's focus
on extreme outcomes. PST and scenario planning share the same ontol-
ogy, viewing the future as constructed by the imaginings of individuals -
implying a strong indeterminism - rather than existing objectively as a
fully-speciﬁable choice set. Yet, under PST individuals constructing the
future through imagination nevertheless seek to deductively identify
the best (subjectively conceived) option; PST therefore assists in over-
coming the divide between the constructivist and deductivist perspec-
tives on scenario planning, which currently acts as a constraint on its
development as a discipline (Wilkinson, 2009; Millett, 2009).
To summarise, the paper therefore has the following objectives:
1) To show that theoretical considerations are not divorced from practi-
cal ones when it comes to scenario planning; the two affect, and are
affected by, each other. We argue that, despite some progress made
in recent years, scenario planning remains theoretically underdevel-
oped, and that the lack of agreement in relation to scenario planning's
theoretical underpinning has led to a proliferation ofmethods and ap-
proaches. This can only be reduced by detailed empirical work toPlease cite this article as: Derbyshire, J., Potential surprise theory as a theor
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.05.008identify those techniques that have themost efﬁcacy. Yet, empiricism
of this type ﬁrstly requires a certain level of theoretical development.
Scenario planningmay therefore be stuck in something of a cleft stick
in which a reduction in the proliferation of techniques and a
more theoretically-settled discipline requires greater empiricism;
yet, for this to occur, there has to be at least some initial agreement
onwhat should be empirically tested, which in turn requires a certain
amount of initial theoretical common ground. The paper shows that
PST contains much of use in establishing this theoretical common
ground.
2) To provide a brief outline of PST and the aspects of it that led Shackle
and those working at Shell in the 1970s and 1980s to consider it the
theoretical manifestation of the practical technique of scenario plan-
ning. Central among these aspects is PST's rejection of probability as
a means for considering the future, the reasons for which are ex-
plained in detail through a discussion of what Shackle referred to
as ‘crucial decisions’, which are not amenable to probabilistic
methods, in contrast to what he called ‘divisible, seriable experi-
ments’, which are amenable to probabilistic approaches to decision
making. The former is the realm of fundamental uncertainty with
which scenario planning is concerned, the latter is instead the
realm of risk, in which conventional forecasting techniques are
more applicable. The paper shows that ever since the advent of sub-
jective expected utility theory - the foundations for which were laid
by Savage (Savage, 1950; Savage, 1954) at approximately the same
time that Shackle was setting out PST in the 1950s (Basili and
Zappia, 2009; Zappia, 2014; Basili and Zappia, 2010) - mainstream
economists, and those in other disciplines that seek to mimic their
approach, have made no distinction between fundamental uncer-
tainty and risk, assuming that both can be dealt with in the same
way using probabilistic (albeit, subjective probabilistic) techniques.
However, the view that risk and fundamental uncertainty are essen-
tially the same and do not require different treatment is increasingly
questioned, thus bringing Shackle's ideas back to contemporary
prominence (Basili and Zappia, 2009). For this reason, building sce-
nario planning's theoretical foundations on PST situates scenario
planning at the heart of contemporary discussions on uncertainty
and how it can be dealt with, taking place in ﬁelds such as decision
making and economics. Becoming part of this broader discussion
can enhance scenario planning's status and proﬁle, assisting in its
development as a disciple.
3) To show how PST is able to lend theoretical support to other (i.e. not
only the use of plausibility) important aspects of the Intuitive Logics
approach to scenario planning, such as its focus on potential extreme
outcomes, and to show that PST and scenario planning share the
same ontology, viewing the future as constructed by the imaginings
of individuals, rather than existing objectively as a fully-speciﬁable
choice set. As such, both PST and scenario planning place indeter-
minism stemming from free will and choice at the centre of
consideration of the future; however, both also envisage this
indeterminism as bounded, rendering anticipation of the future
possible.
4) To show how scenario planning theoretically underpinned by PST
accommodates both a constructivist and deductivist perspective,
resulting in an abductive scenario planning, as advocated in the recent
scenario planning literature. And to evidence a link between PST and
the antifragile approach to dealing with uncertainty (Taleb, 2001,
2007, 2012), which has recently been transformed into a novel
approach to scenario planning (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014).
It should be emphasised that, in exploring the potential for Shackle's
ideas to provide a theoretical foundation for scenario planning, the
paper does not downplay the importance of scenario planning's practi-
cality. In accordance with Shackle's own view (Jefferson, 2014), the
view adopted here is that scenario planning's ‘real world’ practicality
is its main strength. However, as described in the next section, thisetical foundation for scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change
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cation of an explicit theoretical underpinning.
2. Scenario planning's practical origins and limited theoretical
foundations
2.1. Scenario planning's practical origins
As described by Bradﬁeld et al. (Bradﬁeld et al., 2005, p.797), after
WWII the US Department of Defense needed a means to consider
which new weapons systems should be developed. At the height of the
Cold War, they faced uncertainty from multiple sources. Firstly, from
the perennial problem of military procurement that new weapons re-
quire long lead times to develop, resulting in uncertainty about the stra-
tegic environment at the time they become ready to deploy. Secondly,
this was compounded by the lowering of the iron curtain, which greatly
increased uncertainty about the context inwhich potential newweapons
might be deployed. Thirdly, the effectiveness of the developed weapons
depended on the effectiveness of those developed in response by poten-
tial enemies – in particular, the USSR. The uncertainty stemming from
these three combined aspects provided the initial stimulus for the early
development of scenario planning as a discipline (Bradﬁeld et al., 2005).
It is subsequently shown that uncertainties such as these result in
the requirement for what Shackle calls a ‘crucial decision’, or, alterna-
tively, ‘crucial experiment’ (Shackle, 1955a; Shackle, 1961; Zappia,
2014, p.1136). Crucial decisions change the very circumstances in
which the decision is made, so that no future decision can ever be
made in similar circumstances again. The development of a particular
weapons system instead of one of its alternatives is just such a ‘crucial
decision’; the invoked response from enemies who then develop their
own weapons systems will forever change the strategic circumstances
in which the decision was originally made. While scenario planning
emerged for the very practical purpose ofmitigating the uncertainty as-
sociatedwith such decisions during the ColdWar, it was not long before
scenario techniques migrated to the world of business via RAND Corpo-
ration and Royal Dutch Shell (Bradﬁeld et al., 2005). Crucial decisions
are also a source of fundamental uncertainty in this domain. Shell had
found their conventional forecasting and modelling approaches to con-
sideration of the future of limited value under circumstances in which
there was a discontinuity in prevailing trends. Discontinuities lead to a
‘fork in the road’, which in turn render the decision as to which fork to
take a crucial one. The initial scenarios developed by Shell proved suc-
cessful beyond all anticipation, allowing them to identify the plausibility
of a scenario describing impending oil crises in the 1970s and to prepare
mitigation plans accordingly (Jefferson, 1983). As a result, when these
crises transpired, Shell was able to make the crucial decision to reduce
production capacity (Jefferson, 2014), providing them with a competi-
tive advantage over rivals whose production capacities were no longer
appropriate to the changed circumstances. This crucial decision was
aided by the so-called ‘producer miscalculation case’ Shell developed
through several scenario planning iterations (Jefferson, 2012).
This evidences scenario planning's usefulness for dealing with the
type of decision Shackle labelled ‘crucial’ because it changes the very cir-
cumstances in which the decision is made in the ﬁrst place. We later
show how Shackle distinguished such decisions from more mundane
sorts more amenable to probabilistic and computational approaches to
consideration of the future, and how this distinction is perhaps his
most major contribution to theory and a central part of the usefulness
of PST as a theoretical framework for scenario planning.
2.2. The need for theory in scenario planning
Chermack (Chermack, 2002, 2004, 2005) has written widely on the
need for theory in scenario planning, making reference (Chermack,
2002, p.25) to Lewin's (Lewin, 1948) famous phrase: ‘Nothing is quite
as practical as a good theory’. Chermack stated that theory developmentPlease cite this article as: Derbyshire, J., Potential surprise theory as a theor
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.05.008in the ﬁeld of scenario planning, and futures studies more broadly, is dis-
mal (Chermack, 2002 p.25), implying that there is a tendency to think of
method and theory as the same. However, these comments were made
more than a decade ago, and some progress has undoubtedly been
made since then toﬁll in this theoretical void. Anumber of augmentations
to the standard IL approach to scenario planning have been suggested
based on theoretical discussions encompassing, for example, indetermin-
ism (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; Wright et al., 2013; Wright and
Goodwin, 2009), structuration theory (MacKay and Tambeau, 2013)
and Aristotle's philosophy of phronēsis (Cairns et al., 2010). Furthermore,
a useful theoretical discussion relating scenario planning to complexity
theory has also been initiated (Wilkinson et al., 2013; Derbyshire, 2016).
It is inaccurate to say, then, that no progress at all has been made in
theoretically underpinning the practical tool that is scenario planning.
Yet, despite this progress, it is still commonly asserted in the current lit-
erature that scenario planning lacks adequate theoretical development.
For example, Bowman (Bowman, 2015, p.79) has recently implied that
the continued limited theoretical development of scenario planning has
led to a disparateness within the discipline, resulting in scenario plan-
ning ‘drifting between a multitude of frameworks’. And also recently,
Phadnis et al. (Phadnis et al., 2014, p.122) make a similar point, stating
that as many as twenty-three techniques for developing scenarios now
exist, as-well-as at least ten approaches to using scenarios, and linking
this proliferation directly to the failure to develop more comprehensive
theoretical foundations for scenario planning.
Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962), in his research on scientiﬁc paradigms, shows the
evolution of disciplines to follow similar cycles. In the pre-paradigmatic
phase there is no theoretical agreement. The ﬁrst phase of evolution fol-
lowing this is that in which a number - perhaps even a large number - of
theoretical standpoints exists, leading to a proliferation of practical ap-
proaches. Eventually, those researchingwithin theﬁeld gravitate towards
a particular, common theoretical standpoint, leading to a reduction in the
proliferation of practical approaches, and the emergence of agreement in
relation to common theoretical principles and practical techniques. It is
clear from the comments of Phadnis et al. (Phadnis et al., 2014) and
those of Bowman (Bowman, 2015), both of whomwere writing very re-
cently, that scenario planning remains in the early stages of this evolu-
tionary process, with little common agreement in relation to theory and
practical approaches yet evident. While the IL approach to scenario plan-
ning is considered the closest approximation to a ‘standard’ approach in
existence, it continues to be revised, augmented andquestioned - thereby
evidencing this continued lack of agreement.
A problem in terms of moving from this stage to one in which there
is greater stability and agreement on approaches is that scenario plan-
ning may be stuck in something of a cleft-stick. On the one hand, to de-
velop greater theoretical common ground there is a need for empirical
research to identify the practical approaches that work best; yet, at
least if the approach to this is to be deductive and theory-led rather
than the reverse, there needs to be a certain level of theoretical agree-
ment before such empirical testing can take place, so as to identify
what speciﬁcally to test. Establishing scenario planning as a fully-
theorised academic discipline can therefore assist in galvanising the re-
sources and attention needed for additional empirical research into the
efﬁcacy of scenario planning in its many guises, allowing for the identi-
ﬁcation of a core set of proven approaches. As the rest of this paper goes
on to show, PST can form a signiﬁcant part of the theoretical framework
required to achieve this. In the next sectionwe provide a brief outline of
PST to assist the reader in understanding the subsequent discussion of
its usefulness as a theoretical framework for scenario planning.
3. Potential surprise theory
3.1. A brief outline
In Potential Surprise Theory a decision-maker considering the future
chooses among rival strategies based on two elements: expectedetical foundation for scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change
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tion, and the degree of disbelief or implausibility of a particular outcome
(Zappia, 2014, p.1137). Plausibility is therefore measured through a
consideration of its opposite: implausibility or disbelief (Zappia,
2014), which allows Shackle to overcome the problem of additivity as-
sociated with probability, as we describe in detail subsequently. Unlike
belief in a particular outcome, one's disbelief in several currently-
considered future outcomes is not necessarily affected in any way by
consideration of, and disbelief in, a newly-considered future outcome.
This reverse perspective - which undoubtedly appears odd to those
raised on probabilistic thinking with its basis in belief and what is
known about a fully-speciﬁed set of choices - accommodates surprise
and what is currently unknown. It provides room for the addition of
new possibilities that do not currently occur to the decision-maker as
she feels her way into an opaque and emerging future.
The ‘surprise’ element in the theory's name stems from this some-
what unusual means to consider plausibility based on implausibility, or
belief in terms of disbelief. Shackle viewed the ‘degree of belief’ in a par-
ticular future outcome as simply corresponding to ‘the degree of surprise
to which this belief exposes us and will subject us in case the hypothesis
proves false’ (Zappia, 2014, p.1138; Shackle, 1949a, p.9). To arrive at a
measure of ‘disbelief’ or ‘implausibility’, PST envisages individuals as
being able to assign degrees of surprise ranging from zero for outcomes
that seem perfectly possible, to a maximum representing complete as-
tonishment for outcomes that, under current conditions, seem complete-
ly impossible. To arrive at values on this ‘surprise scale’, Shackle envisages
individuals asking themselves ‘How surprised would I be if this outcome
actually occurred, if, at the time it occurred, I were still looking at the
world in the way I look at it right now?’ (Earl and Littleboy, 2014, p.88).
One answer could be ‘Not at all surprised, this seems perfectly possible’,
or it could instead be ‘Very surprised indeed, there is just somuch stand-
ing in itsway’ (Earl and Littleboy, 2014, p.88). Thismeasure of plausibility
(via implausibility) is combined with the stimulus provided by the
decision-maker's imagined potential gain or loss from the particular en-
deavour under consideration. By combining these two elements - poten-
tial gains and losses and plausibility - the decision-maker is able to rank
particular actions on the basis of the ‘potential surprise’ associated with
their imagined outcomes. For each action the focus is on two extreme
values (called ‘focus outcomes’), which are determined formally as
resulting from the maximisation of a continuous stimulation function
(for potential gains and losses) subject to a continuous potential surprise
function (for plausibility) (Zappia, 2014, p.1139). It therefore becomes
possible to compare and order actions based on how imaginable and ar-
resting the potential gains and losses are, as modiﬁed by the plausibility
of their occurrence.
This process can be summarised as follows:
1) For theparticular aspect of the future under consideration (e.g.wheth-
er to start a business of one type or another; to innovate a particular
new product or to improve an existing product; to build a
submarine-based or land-based nuclear deterrent etc., depending on
the ﬁeld of interest), imagine a set of rival strategies and their out-
comes.
2) For each outcome to each strategy, consider its plausibility (e.g.
whether its transpiring is perfectly possible, or its outcome would be
somewhat surprising, or completely implausible etc. under current
conditions), resulting in a measure on the ‘surprise scale’ for that
outcome.
3) For each outcome to each strategy, imagine the impact (e.g. the gains
or the losses that might be accrued) should it transpire.
4) For each strategy, identify the single outcome which is most arrest-
ing because of the combination of its plausibility (as in 2) and its po-
tential positive impact (as in 3), and the single outcome that is most
arresting because of its plausibility (as in 2) and its potential nega-
tive impact (as in 3). For each particular strategy, this results in the
creation of two ‘focus outcomes’ (one representing gains and thePlease cite this article as: Derbyshire, J., Potential surprise theory as a theor
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.05.008other losses) determined formally as themaximisation of a continu-
ous stimulation function (for potential gains and losses) subject to a
continuous potential surprise function (for plausibility) (Zappia,
2014, p.1139).
5) For all strategies, compare the respective pairs of focus outcomes in
light of the respective (and subjective to the individual decision-
maker) attitude towards the trade-off between losses and gains
(Earl and Littleboy, 2014, p.98).
6) Select the strategy for which this trade-off is maximised (i.e. poten-
tial gains are largest in comparison to potential losses) in relation to
the subjective appetite for uncertainty.
The use of focus outcomes to direct attention is an aspect of this pro-
cedure which is particularly congruent with scenario planning. Both PST
and scenario planning view the natural means by which experts deliber-
ate about the future as being one in which they focus on plausible ex-
treme outcomes. Wright et al. (Wright et al., 2013, p.634) show that in
stage 4 of the standard IL approach to scenario planning ‘two extreme,
but yet highly plausible’ outcomes are deﬁned. In stage 5 of the process
key scenario factors are identiﬁed as ‘thosewhich have both themost im-
pact on the issue of concern and also the highest degree of uncertainty as
to their resolution as outcomes’ (Wright et al., 2013, p.634). These then
form the basis of the 2 × 2 matrix from which, in turn, four scenarios
are derived – one for each quadrant of this matrix. This focus on extreme,
but yet highly plausible outcomes, in combination with a focus on their
impact, is an aspect of the IL scenario planning process that is in ‘essential
unity’ with PST, as Shackle suggested in the 1980s in his private corre-
spondence with Shell's then Chief Economist Michael Jefferson
(Jefferson, 2014, p.210). Another is PST's use of plausibility rather than
probability, with PST essentially being a means by which to think about
the future explicitly design to avoid using probability. As described
below in detail, the reasoning behind Shackle's rejection of probability
provides strong theoretical support for scenario planning.
3.2. The inadequacy of probability as a means for considering the future
3.2.1. Probability and the problem of ‘crucial decisions’
A central part of the commonality - or the ‘essentially unity’, as Shack-
le put it (Jefferson, 2014, p.210) - between Potential Surprise Theory, as
set out above, and scenario planning, is that both employ plausibility in-
stead of probability. Indeed, Shackle's most enduring contribution to the
literature was to show in detail why probability is a highly problematic
means for considering certain aspects of the future – those characteristic
of fundamental uncertainty, which are also the domain of scenario plan-
ning. Shackle shows that frequency-based probability amounts, essential-
ly, to the outcome from a series of ‘trials’ of the same type – a ‘reference
class’ in the parlance of probability theory. For example, tossing a fair
coin many times represents a ‘series of trials’, each constituent trial of
which would likely be conducted with the same coin, tossed by the
same person, probably in the same environment. Even where some of
these conditions vary to some extent (Shackle, 1955a, p.22), there is
still knowledge to be gained from such a series of trials, but to gain this
knowledge the series must be treated as a whole, allowing for the crea-
tion of a frequency ratio. In this case, this represents the ratio by which
the coin lands with heads facing upwards compared to tails. Over a sufﬁ-
ciently long series, of course, the ratio will approximate 50/50 and, in this
simple example, this is the knowledgewhich the ‘series of trials’provides.
This knowledge is useful for decision-making about the future because a
future series of trials of the same type will yield the same ratio.
The important point to note is that this useful knowledge can only be
accrued through a process of aggregating together individual trials to
form an overall ‘experiment’. Such aggregation can only occur because
each individual trial (toss of the coin) is sufﬁciently similar to every
other. For this reason, Shackle refers to this type of aggregated experi-
ment as ‘divisible’, because the useful knowledge accrued from it is
achieved by dividing the problem into a series of replicable trials of theetical foundation for scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change
1 However, it can be countered in response to the problemof additivity that a ‘residual hy-
pothesis’ can be used as a catch-all category for future outcomes that do not currently occur
to the decision-maker and whichmust, therefore, subsequently be added as their possibility
emerges and is recognised. Shackle discussed this issue in several places in hiswork (Shackle,
1955a, p.59-62) and considered the idea that a residual hypothesis can overcome the prob-
lemof additivity in relation to a frequency-based approach to probability - as in a seriable, di-
visible experiment - to be an ‘insidious fallacy’ (Shackle, 1961, p.111). Yet, even within a
subjective probability approach, inwhich probabilities are not assigned on the basis of objec-
tive frequencies, there remains the same problem of having to adjust the probabilities previ-
ously attached to those outcomes already considered and known, so as to accommodate a
new possibility that emerges from the residual to become part of the known and considered
outcomes over time. Shackle therefore maintained that the use of a residual hypothesis is
simply an acknowledgement by the decision-maker ‘that he has no basis for considering
his existing list of particularized hypotheses to be comprehensive’ (Basili and Zappia, 2009,
p.251-252). Shackle therefore considered the subjective probability approach to be unable
to accommodate the use of a residual hypothesis in the sameway a frequency-based proba-
bilistic approach is unable to (Basili andZappia, 2009, p.262). See Basili and Zappia (Basili and
Zappia, 2009) for a discussion of this issue, as-well-as recent developments in relation to
‘non-additive probability theory’ which seek to deal with the problem of uncertainty by
retaining the use of probability but avoiding its additive nature.
5J. Derbyshire / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxsame type. By clearly establishing the simple concept of a seriable, divis-
ible experiment leading to a frequency-ratio Shackle canmore easily out-
line an accurate conceptualisation of the opposite: a non-seriable, non-
divisible experiment, which is not amenable to probabilistic reasoning.
This is a single act which cannot be ‘broken down into a number of
more elementary performances’ (Shackle, 1955a, p.23), all of which re-
semble each other and which, when taken together, allow the observer
to accrue useful knowledge in the form of a frequency-ratio. This is the
nature of what Shackle calls a ‘crucial experiment/decision’ (Shackle,
1955a, p.6). Crucial decisions are incapable of absorption into a reference
class by anymeans, even by pooling their occurrence across themany dif-
ferent individuals or organisations to which they occur; and, for this rea-
son, probabilistic reasoning is of no use for dealing with crucial decisions.
Wright et al. (Wright et al., 2013) show that scenario planning is car-
ried out with three common objectives in mind, one of which is to im-
prove decision-making. The types of decision for which scenario
planning is conducted are those that are strategic in nature (Wright
et al., 2013), representing crucial decisions. For example, Shell's decision
to reduce capacity in light of an anticipated reduced supply of oil prior
to the ‘oil crises’ of the 1970s (Jefferson, 1983, 2012, 2014) was a crucial
strategic decision that was not amenable to a divisible, seriable experi-
ment. Shell could not run a series of trials to test their decision to reduce
capacity; oil-reﬁning capacity cannot be ramped up and down easily, so a
decision to reduce capacity has serious strategic implications if incorrect.
In other words, Shell's decision changed the very circumstances in which
it was made, so that future decisions would never again be made in the
same circumstances - which is the essence of a crucial decision. For this
reason they used scenario planning rather than the computer-based,
probabilistic means to consider the future they had previously relied on
(Jefferson, 1983, 2012, 2014). As this example shows, Shackle's concept
of a crucial decision is therefore highly useful as a theoretical justiﬁcation
for the use of scenario planning instead of probabilistic and projection-
based modelling approaches. It is crucial decisions that make scenario
planning necessary.
3.2.2. Probability and the problem of ‘additivity’
At the time Shackle was setting out his ideas in the 1940s and 1950s,
Savage was laying the foundations of what would become the subjective
expected utility approach to decision making (Savage, 1950, 1954;
Zappia, 2014). Proponents of this approach could – and, indeed, did
(Zappia, 2014) – respond to Shackle's discussion of the crucial-decision
problem by agreeing that it applied to a frequency-based approach to
probability, but stating that it does not apply to a subjective probability
approach. The use of subjective probability could accommodate crucial
decisions, it is argued, because evenwhere an objective probability distri-
bution cannot be created based on frequency, a subjective one can any-
way be elicited from individuals' decision-making behaviour (Zappia,
2014, p.1134). Yet, even if this is so, there remains a fundamental prob-
lem with probability, as shown by Shackle (Shackle, 1955a, p.68-74):
the problem of ‘additivity’.
The ‘additivity’ that the problem's name refers to is the adding to-
gether of the probabilities of rival hypotheses about the future. If we
imagine there to be three possible outcomes (‘hypotheses’, as Shack-
le refers to them (Shackle, 1955a, p.8)) in relation to a particular as-
pect of the future, under probability theory the sum of their rival
probabilities must amount to unity (i.e. to 1). Therefore, if a new hy-
pothesis emerges as to a fourth possible outcome, it can only be ac-
commodated by reducing the probabilities associated with the
current hypotheses, by adjusting one or more of them downwards.
It stands to reason, then, that for probabilistic reasoning to be useful,
and in order to avoid this problem, the entire set of possible out-
comes must be known in advance – the ‘choice set’must be complete
from the start. This is a fundamental assumption at the heart of the
Kolmogorov axioms that underpin probability theory (Kolmogorov,
1956). These axioms assume that all possible outcomes are incorpo-
rated within a currently considered event space, such that thePlease cite this article as: Derbyshire, J., Potential surprise theory as a theor
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space will occur is equal to unity. Whereas, from the PST perspective,
where there is an abundance of uncertainty and complexity about
the future, as there is in relation to crucial decisions, this assumption
will not hold, and an outcome that is not currently considered, and
which is therefore not part of the current event space, could be the
actual outcome. Under the Kolmogorov axioms, if the event space
cannot be fully and precisely deﬁned in advance, then the probability
of any one outcome, or even of any subset of outcomes, cannot be
deﬁned.
For most - or even all - crucial aspects of the future, a full set of possi-
ble outcomes is not known, and cannever be known, in advance.We can-
not know the full set of possible outcomes so as to reduce the problem of
the future to one of probability (Shackle, 1984, p.75). When closure can-
not occur, additional possible outcomes must be added as we feel our
way into an opaque future.Wemust add to currently considered possible
outcomes newpossible outcomes, but this cannot be donewithin a prob-
abilistic approachwithout diluting the importance attributed to currently
considered outcomes. This problem of ‘additivity’ applies whether prob-
ability is frequency-based, as in a seriable, divisible experiment, or con-
ceived of in subjective terms, as in subjective expected utility theory.
In relation to this Earl and Littleboy (Earl and Littleboy, 2014, p.115)
discuss how Shackle viewed games in which innovations in strategy
occur over time to be problematic for probabilistic reasoning. Inmost en-
vironments inwhich scenario planning is employed, just such innovation
occurs. The development of a particularweapon systemby one power in-
vokes a response which may negate it by another. Individuals alter their
behaviour in light of changed circumstances and their observations of
the behaviour of others. This reﬂexivity is at the heart of fundamental un-
certainty and it acts against the possibility of ever having a closed choice
set. Under these circumstances, the problem of additivity becomes acute.
The use of subjective probabilities does not assist with this as they must
still amount to unity, meaning there is still a requirement to adjust
down existing hypotheses about the future to accommodate a further
one. Shackle objected to the adjusting downwards of existing conjectures
as new ones are added (Shackle, 1955a). In his view, the emergence of a
new hypothesis does not affect, in the decision-makers' mind, the possi-
bility of the occurrence of existing hypotheses, as a probabilistic approach
implies itmust. It is for this reason that Shackle bases hismeasurement of
potential surprise on disbelief in a particular outcome, rather than belief
(Shackle, 1955a, p.30). Disbelief in a newly occurring hypothesis does
not affect disbelief in existing hypotheses, removing the problem of
additivity.1etical foundation for scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change
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planning
Ramirez and Selin (Ramirez and Selin, 2014) state that the debate
about probability and plausibility in scenario planning is a long-running
one that has never been adequately resolved, leading to confusion. They
evidence this by reference to Godet (Godet, 2000) who situates the possi-
ble as a constituent part of the probable, whereas elsewhere the reverse
view is taken (Ramirez and Selin, 2014). It is also evidenced by Millet
(Millett, 2009) who suggests using plausibility but then attaching subjec-
tive probabilities to scenarios. However, Jefferson (Jefferson, 1983, 2012,
2014) states that, during the 1970s period in which Shell successfully
used scenario planning to anticipate the forthcoming oil crises, they explic-
itly chose not to attach probabilities because this undermined the scenario
process. It focused too much attention on the probabilities themselves,
thereby demotivating participants to examine in detail futures perceived
as having low probabilities, but which could be highly damaging.
According to Ramirez and Selin (Ramirez and Selin, 2014), the debate
about probability andplausibilitymanifests itself in three distinct ‘cultural
clashes’. Each of these is associatedwith a preference for one or the other
of probability or plausibility. Firstly, there is the qualitative versus quanti-
tative ‘cultural’ divide in scenario work. Secondly, there is that between
thosewishing to approximate prediction and thosewho think that funda-
mental uncertainty implies the impossibility of prediction. Thirdly, there
is the divide between those who see scenario planning as an art and
thosewho see it as a science.Which side of these ‘cultural clashes’ one be-
longs to determines one's viewwith regards to probability and plausibil-
ity. As Ramirez and Selin (Ramirez and Selin, 2014) go on to suggest, one
groupprivileges a deductive, positivist and reductionist approach, leading
to claims about ‘truth’ in relation to future reality, and an advocating of
the quantitative, predictive and ‘scientiﬁc’ approach to scenario planning.
A second group is on the side of qualitative, non-predictive scenario plan-
ning as an ‘art’. For this group the future is constructed. Wilkinson
(Wilkinson, 2009) makes a similar distinction when referring to the for-
mer group as ‘Homo-Deductivist’ and the latter as ‘Homo-Constructivist’,
and Millet (Millett, 2009) identiﬁes two similar groups.
The theoretical insight of the crucial nature of some aspects of the
future, taken alongside Shackle's discussion of the problem of additivity
and the impossibility of a fully-speciﬁed choice set - both problems PST
was designed to overcome - provide the means to settle the debate
about probability and plausibility in scenario planning. A probabilistic
approach is of no use for dealing with crucial decisions and the require-
ment for additivity renders probability an impracticalmeans for consid-
eration of the future; because of the inability to ‘close’ choice sets, it is
necessary to add conjectures over time, as the future unfolds, without
diminishing the possibility of currently considered outcomes. Shackle's
detailed distinction between the crucial aspects of the future, and the
more mundane divisible and seriable – and, therefore, probabilistic –
aspects, provides a compelling theoretical justiﬁcation for the use of
plausibility in scenario planning, the theoretical justiﬁcation for which
is sometimes left implicit currently.
4. Using PST to situate scenario planning within the broader
contemporary debate on fundamental uncertainty
4.1. The initial rise and then decline of PST
Knight, writing in the 1920s (Knight, 1921), was among the ﬁrst to
set out a distinction between risk and uncertainty. Knight explicitly stat-
ed that ‘Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the
familiar notion of Risk, fromwhich it has never been properly separated’
(Knight, 1921, p.19). Keynes, writing in the 1930s (Keynes, 1936, 1937),
made a similar distinction, describing his view on uncertainty thus:
“By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, letme explain, I do notmeanmerely to dis-
tinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable…ThePlease cite this article as: Derbyshire, J., Potential surprise theory as a theor
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.05.008sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a
Europeanwar is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of inter-
est twenty years hence…About these matters there is no scientiﬁc basis
onwhich to formany calculable probabilitywhatever” [emphasis added],
(Keynes, 1937, p.113-114).
It is clear, then, that Shackle was not the ﬁrst economist of note to
distinguish between decisions that are crucial, and therefore subject to
fundamental uncertainty for which probability is no aid, and other
types of decision that are more akin to risk, which are more amenable
to probabilistic reasoning. Indeed, Shackle would have been more
aware of the provenance of his ideas on uncertainty than anyone else
since his second major contribution to economics after PST was his
many writings on Keynes (Earl and Littleboy, 2014); Shackle was one
of the 20th century's most prominent experts on Keynes (Earl and
Littleboy, 2014).
However, at approximately the same time that Keynes published his
‘General Theory’ in 1936 (Keynes, 1936), two other economists, Ramsey
(Ramsey, 1976) and de Finetti (de Finetti, 1937, 1974), published work
that laid the foundations for a wholly different (from that of Knight,
Keynes and Shackle) perspective on uncertainty - one which remains
dominant to this day. This now dominant alternative makes no distinc-
tion between risk and uncertainty, implying both can be treated in the
same way using a subjective probabilistic approach. It assumes that
those making decisions under circumstances of uncertainty, as under
circumstances of risk, behave according to a set of decision-making
rules such that they maximise their subjective expected utility by
using probability assumptions that are continually updated through
the use of Bayes theorem (Bayes, 1764; Feduzi and Runde, 2014,
p.271; Basili and Zappia, 2009; Zappia, 2014).
This perspective on uncertainty was further elaborated by Savage in
1950 and 1954 (Savage, 1950, 1954). Essentially, it implies that even in
situations in which an ‘objective’ probability distribution, based on fre-
quency of past occurrences, cannot be created, a subjective probability
distribution can anyway be inferred from individual decision-making
behaviour; and this subjective distribution is perfectly valid as a
decision-making device even under circumstances characteristic of un-
certainty, as long as the decision-maker's internal beliefs are consistent
with each other. The upshot is that individuals are assumed to behave in
the samewaywhen facing either risk or uncertainty in decisionmaking;
and probability, in contrast to the view of Knight, Keynes and Shackle, is
a useful means for dealing with uncertainty as-well-as risk.
During this period (the early 1950s), in which Savage laid the
foundations for the subjective expected utility approach, Shackle's prom-
inence within economics was at its height and, for a time, his alternative,
non-probabilistic approach (PST) viedwith subjective expected utility for
acceptance as the ‘standard’ approach to decision-making under uncer-
tainty (Zappia, 2014). However, Shackle's approach gradually fell out of
favour, leaving the centre ground to subjective expected utility theory.
The reason for this, according to Zappia (Zappia, 2014), is in no small
measure due to Shackle's personality - his unwillingness to engage with
opponents, even those who were sympathetic to the importance of a be-
havioural distinction between the treatment of risk and uncertainty.
In fact, as Earl and Littleboy (Earl and Littleboy, 2014) describe,
Shackle made no attempt whatsoever to take on the emerging early
subjective probability approach, such that looking back at his work dur-
ing that period in conjunction with his private correspondence, it ap-
pears that Shackle simply did not even notice that the subjective
probability approach had arisen while he had been setting out PST.
However, this lack of engagement may have been because Shackle con-
sidered himself to be embarked on a wholly different journey to that of
the subjective probability theorists. Subjective expected utility theory
does not have reference points distinguishing potential outcomes in
terms of gains and losses, or a focussing on extreme outcomes. Shackle's
primary concern, then, is on how the individual may make important
decisions, not on how insurance companies and others make decisionsetical foundation for scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change
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stemmed from a consideration that his primary concern was a decision
of a different type to that which is the domain of subjective expected
utility theory.
Shackle's ideas graduallymoved from a position of vying for the cen-
tre ground in economics in the1940s and1950s, to a peripheral position
in subsequent decades, where they have remained until recently
(Zappia, 2014). Ever since, a considerable amount of research in main-
stream economics, as-well-as in other disciplines such as decision-
making, has been devoted to an attempt to reduce decision problems
under uncertainty to decision problems under risk. However, this may
now be changing, bringing Shackle back to prominence (Basili and
Zappia, 2009).
4.2. The return to prominence
Shackle's PST is returning to prominence because there is increasing
recognition that failing to distinguish between risk and uncertainty is
untenable (Basili and Zappia, 2009). We now live in a world in which
the distinctiveness of uncertainty - as-well-as its ubiquity - is perhaps
more undeniable than ever before. Events such as the credit crunch, 9/
11, and wars such as that in Syria, render the nature of uncertainty
and its intractability tangible. Greater interconnectedness provides us
with large amounts of data to analyse, implying the greater possibility
of a probabilistic, computational approach to uncertainty; yet, this
mass of data arguably increases opacity and uncertainty, rather than re-
ducing it (Taleb, 2001, 2007).
The increasing recognition of a qualitative difference between risk
and uncertainty is reﬂected in the growing literature on the subject of
‘deep uncertainty’ (Maier et al., 2016). Deep uncertainty is gaining in-
creasing attention in the climate-change ﬁeld in particular. Prominent
authors in this ﬁeld, such as Kwakkel et al. (Kwakkel et al., 2016),
refer to the ‘conﬂuence’ of uncertainties we now face - including in re-
lation to climate change - the interactions between which compound
their ‘wickedness’, rendering them irreducible to risk. Similarly, Maier
et al. (Maier et al., 2016, p.155), also writing within this ﬁeld, explicitly
refer to a distinction between ‘Knightian’ uncertainty and probabilistic
risk in their discussion of deep uncertainty. The growing recognition
of this distinction in this ﬁeld is leading to increasing emphasis on
scenario-based approaches used in conjunction with formal modelling,
since scenario techniques are considered more capable of dealing with
uncertainty than are formal-modelling approaches used in isolation
(Turnheim et al., 2015, p.248; Fortes et al., 2015; McDowall, 2014;
Fontela, 2000; Alcamo, 2008; Trutnevyte et al., 2014).
Moreover, even in mainstream economics, the view that there is a
fundamental distinction between risk and uncertainty is gaining
ground. Basili and Zappia (Basili and Zappia, 2009) state that in main-
stream economics the view that risk and uncertainty are equivalent is
no longer treated as an unquestionable dogma. This is propelling Shack-
le and PST to the forefront of contemporary debates in these ﬁelds
(Basili and Zappia, 2009). Shackle's PST was ahead of its time (Zappia,
2014) and is only now receiving the attention and prominence it argu-
ably should always have done. By underpinning scenario planning with
PST, scenario planning can ride the crest of the same wave that is pro-
pelling Shackle's ideas back to prominence. In the 1950s, the economist
Kenneth Arrow (Arrow, 1951) singled out PST as distinct from other
contemporary approaches thatmade a distinction between risk and un-
certainty because it is the only one to be fully formalised (Zappia, 2014,
p.1134). While Knight and Keynes made a similar distinction between
risk and uncertainty, only Shackle set out a complete, non-
probabilistic approach to dealing with uncertainty. If any existing theo-
ry, then, can provide a theoretical underpinning for scenario planning -
which also emphasises the fundamental distinctiveness of uncertainty
and how to deal with it - it must therefore be PST.
Shackle showed that once time is taken into consideration, accurate
foreknowledge becomes a logical impossibility (Shackle, 1970, 1980),Please cite this article as: Derbyshire, J., Potential surprise theory as a theor
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the adaptation of actions (‘sequels’), taken in light of present occur-
rences, means a complete choice set (leading to a fully-speciﬁed event
space) can never be known in advance. As noted by Basili and Zappia
(Basili and Zappia, 2009, p.250), the problem of an incomplete choice
set, so emphasised by Shackle, ‘bears close resemblance’ to the perspec-
tive adopted by modern day critics of the mainstream subjective ex-
pected utility approach to decision-making. This is one of the primary
reasons that PST is now gaining traction having lain, if not dormant,
then peripheral for decades.
A central aspect of this contemporary criticismof themainstreamper-
spective is the view that it only applies in a ‘closed universe’ (Basili and
Zappia, 2009, p.250; Binmore andBrandenburger, 1990) inwhich all pos-
sibilities can be enumerated in advance. In contrast to this, the futures of
most systems of interest - such as the economy, the environment, or the
strategy of individual organisations - are open and undetermined, acting
against the possibility of ever fully-specifying all possible outcomes in ad-
vance. Shackle's PST, in emphasising the role of individual imagination in
shaping the future, acknowledges that the future is constructed, open and
impossible to close in the way mainstream decision-making theory im-
plies; scenario planning acknowledges the same. In sum, scenario plan-
ning underpinned by Potential Surprise Theory can relegate the
subjective expected utility approach to its rightful place as a means for
dealing with circumstances characteristic of risk; scenario planning can
then become the standard approach to dealing with uncertainty as dis-
tinct from risk.5. Potential surprise theory as a theoretical framework for scenario
planning
5.1. The shared ontology of potential surprise theory and scenario planning
Reading Shackle's many works, his emphasis on the freedom to
choose, and its implications for thinking about the future, can strike the
reader almost as an obsession. That freedom to choose implies that the
future is highly indeterminate is self-evident. The outcome of any choice
made by an individual decision-maker depends not only on that choice,
but the choicemade bymany others in response to it. This reﬂexivity im-
plies a strong indeterminism. As Loasby puts it (Loasby, 1984, p.81), since
in Shackle's view the decision-maker is not even certain of his/her own
future conjectures and contingent choice sets, it is certainly beyond capa-
bility to know those of others in response. According to Loasby, Shackle is
therefore implying that a lack of foreknowledge about the future is irre-
mediable (Loasby, 1984). Because of this seeming irremediableness,
Shackle's theorising has been interpreted as highly nihilistic and self-
defeating, negating any possibility of anticipating the future before it ar-
rives (Earl and Kay, 1985).
However, in order to emphasise the indeterminism stemming from
the freedom to choose and, related to this, our responsibility for the fu-
ture, Shackle sometimes took to unrealistic extremes. This is evident in
Shackle's tendency to characterise Potential Surprise Theory as ameans
for decision-making that is entirely independent of antecedent condi-
tions, stemming instead from the ‘autonomous, absolute origination’
of the imagination of the decision-maker (Shackle, 1984, p.73), imply-
ing an absolute formof subjectivity and, therefore, absolute indetermin-
ism because of this absolute subjectivity. The irremediable lack of
foreknowledge about the future Loasby speaks of is reﬂective of this
tendency to take an extreme view so as to emphasise indeterminism,
choice and responsibility for the future. However, in reality, PST, like
scenario planning, recognises that antecedent conditions affect future
outcomes.
The tendency to mischaracterise his own theory so as to emphasise
responsibility for the future was recognised by Shackle himself, as cap-
tured in private correspondence written by Shackle to John Spiers,
Chairman of Wheatsheef Books, in which Shackle (1987) writes:etical foundation for scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change
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treme of following out the consequences of supposing that thoughts
can be in some respects exempt from governance by antecedents or
current perceptions. This supposition will enable us to claim some
responsibility for the course of things, releasing us from determin-
ism and would require us to renounce any power of single-track
prediction’ (emphasis added).
In acknowledging the extremity of this position, Shackle is acknowl-
edging that choices do not occur in a vacuum. Individuals, or organisa-
tions such as governments or businesses, do not have a boundless
range of options leading to an ability to conjure into existence any desir-
able future, exempt from the inﬂuence of antecedents. If this were true, it
would not be necessary to consider the future at all, but simply bring the
most desirable vision of it into being. Rather, the past, and perceptions of
the present, impinge upon perceptions as to present options, which in
turn bound the future. Individuals make ‘history-to-come’, as Shackle
called it (Shackle, 1984), but not in circumstances of their own choosing.
While emphasising the indeterminism resulting from subjectivity, choice
and reﬂexivity, so as to afﬁrm our responsibility for the future, Shackle
recognised this. In PST, future possibilities are, therefore, not considered
boundless; decision-makers are able to dismiss future possibilities on
the basis of ‘fatal ﬂaws’ (i.e. immovable obstacles) to their realisation
(Shackle, 1984, p.70), bounding the range of possible outcomes.
Furthermore, Shackle, in Imagination and the Nature of Choice
(Shackle, 1979, p.2), makes reference to the importance of ‘constant el-
ements’, which can be characterised as the prevailing trends within the
particular ‘ﬁeld’ inwhich a decision is to bemade, and the impingement
of these upon the decision. Hereinwe see further crossoverwith scenar-
io planning,which incorporates the identiﬁcation of ‘pre-determined el-
ements’ (Wright et al., 2013), which are akin to Shackle's ‘constant
elements’. Antecedent conditions and current perceptions (of what
may transpire as important for shaping the future) feature strongly in
the early stages of the IL scenario process through the identiﬁcation,
often through use of a PESTEL framework, of the ‘driving forces’ (i.e.
causes) expected to bring about change in the future (Wright et al.,
2013, p.634). PST and scenario planning both envisage the future as
made up of what Shackle referred to as ‘the plurality of sequels’ to em-
phasise indeterminism; under both, this plurality is bounded by current
perceptions as to salient features of the future in the minds of the indi-
viduals considering it, and by their perception of antecedent conditions,
which act to narrow the range of possibilities.
5.2. A shared philosophy of vigilance and scepticism in the face of
uncertainty
How theprocess of imagination, leading to the formation of expecta-
tions, is visualised as occurring by Shackle is a particularly important as-
pect of PST in terms of a shared philosophical approach, based on
scepticism in the face of uncertainty, as also adopted in empirical exam-
ples of successful scenario planning. This philosophical stance towards
uncertainty is a further, important aspect of the shared ontology of
PST and scenario planning.
Shackle envisages individuals asking themselves ‘How surprised
would I be if this outcome actually occurred, if, at the time it occurred,
I were still looking at the world in the way I look at it right now?’
(Earl and Littleboy, 2014, p.88). One answer could be ‘Very surprised in-
deed, there is just somuch standing in itsway’ (Earl and Littleboy, 2014,
p.88); another answermight be ‘Not surprised at all, since there is so lit-
tle standing in its way’. In other words, the decision-maker considers
barriers and enablers of a particular future's realisation, leading to the
formation of a view on plausibility. However, Earl and Littleboy (Earl
and Littleboy, 2014) highlight the possibility for this process to become
mired in an inﬁnite regress since the full process, as outlined by Shackle,
involves iterative consideration of barriers and enablers. There is con-
sideration, then, of the barriers and enablers of a particular future, andPlease cite this article as: Derbyshire, J., Potential surprise theory as a theor
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and then the barriers and enabling factors of those barriers and en-
ablers, and so on, ad inﬁnitum. Theprocess of consideration of the future
could easily become stymied then, with the mass of conﬂicting future
possibilities and counter possibilities leading to a fog of complexity
(Earl and Littleboy, 2014). Furthermore, it is always possible that
when operating within such a fog of complexity our imaginations over-
look an important factor,whether an enabler or preventer of a particular
future, which, had we considered it, would have caused that particular
outcome to gain or diminish in prominence in our considerations.
Shackle was aware of these problems and so, ultimately, the under-
lying normative philosophy towards uncertainty that runs as a thread
through PST is one which constantly emphasises the importance of re-
maining vigilant in the face of uncertainty, by never accepting that our
expectations are deﬁnitive and complete. To avoid being taken by sur-
prise it is necessary to look for barriers to outcomes that we might not
previously have considered, or enablers which may promote in impor-
tance a previously-downgraded outcome. PST, then, promotes an atti-
tude of scepticism leading to a constant questioning of conventional
wisdom and widely-held assumptions. Jefferson shows (Jefferson,
1983) that it was exactly such a vigilant attitude of scepticism towards
received wisdom, and the constant questioning and updating of consid-
ered barriers and enablers of particular future outcomes, that allowed
thoseworking on scenario planning at Shell in the 1970s to successfully
anticipate the forthcoming oil crises. PST and scenario planning there-
fore both promote a philosophy of vigilance and scepticism as a
means to deal with uncertainty.
5.3. Similarities to the anti-fragile approach to uncertainty and scenario
planning
This philosophy of scepticism and vigilance also has much in com-
mon with N. N. Taleb's anti-fragile method for dealing with uncertainty
(Taleb, 2001, 2007, 2012), which has recently been transformed into a
novel scenario-planning approach (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014).
Taleb (Taleb, 2001, 2007, 2012) also places strong emphasis on remain-
ing sceptical and, in light of the aforementioned fallibility of the human
imagination, and the potential to overlook or to be unable to identify
important enabling or disenabling factors (i.e. causes), suggests focus-
ing instead on potential outcomes without necessarily considering the
cause of those outcomes (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014; Taleb, 2012).
Indeed, Taleb makes reference to Knight, Keynes and Shackle (Taleb,
2001, p.188) and their distinction between risk and uncertainty in his
three-volume treatise on uncertainty which ends with the setting out
of the anti-fragile approach to dealing with it (Derbyshire and Wright,
2014).
The similarity between anti-fragility and PST is evident in that under
PST the ascendency function, representing combined expectations in re-
lation to plausibility and pay-off, leads to the creation of focus gains and
losses for each possible future outcome, leading in turn to the selection
of that option in which potential losses are smallest relative to the size
of potential expected gains, and depending on the decision-maker's
subjective appetite for uncertainty. Under anti-fragility's convex distri-
bution of pay-offs (Derbyshire andWright, 2014, p.219) there is similar-
ly a focus loss in the form of a cut-off point beyondwhich losses cannot
occur. Furthermore,while there is not a ﬁxed level of expected gain as in
PST, constituting a ‘focal’ gain, under anti-fragility decisions are never-
thelessmade in a similar spirit in that the optionwith the largest poten-
tial for exponential gains, but a clear focal cut-off point for losses, is that
which should be selected.
5.4. Potential surprise theory: normative or descriptive?
One aspect of PST's normative nature as a decision-making theory
has already been touched upon above. It promotes a normative philos-
ophy of vigilance and scepticism in the face of uncertainty such thatetical foundation for scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change
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ular considered futures are deﬁnitive. We must constantly seek to up-
date our view of these based on new, emerging information, and we
should constantly question received wisdom. Beyond this normative,
general attitude towards uncertainty, the actual mechanics of the PST
decision-making process are also normative in the sense that it repre-
sents a description of how decision-making should be conducted in
order to avoid being caught out by surprises. Yet, it is clear from
Shackle's theoretical discussions setting out PST that he also considered
it to describe theway that crucial decisions aremade empirically.While
Shackle did not himself engage in any empirical research to provide ev-
idence that might support PST as descriptive of real-world decision-
making, others have conducted research that lends PST some support
in this regard.
Earl and Littleboy (Earl and Littleboy, 2014, p.168) consider the ex-
tent towhichKahneman and Tversky's empirical work on ‘Prospect the-
ory’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2011; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974, 1982, 1983) provides empirical validation for PST.
While prospect theory is a subjective expected utility approach based
ﬁrmly on probabilistic-reasoning, which Shackle spent a lifetime
rejecting, it lends weight to Shackle's thinking in that it views individ-
uals as thinking about outcomes in terms of prospective gains and
losses. As such, under prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
as in PST, large losses weigh more heavily on the mind of the
decision-maker, explaining the empirical phenomenon in which indi-
viduals are willing to take large risks in order to avoid making a loss,
and the so-called ‘endowment effect’, whereby individuals' willingness
to pay for something they do not yet have is less than they would be
willing to accept for that same thing upon possessing it (Earl and
Littleboy, 2014, p.168). However, the empirical work conducted in rela-
tion to prospect theory did not ask individuals about major,
circumstances-changing decisions (Earl and Littleboy, 2014, p.171) -
those which Shackle characterised as ‘crucial’. While one can easily
ask individuals to decide upon different small sums of money to empir-
ically test prospect theory, the crucial nature of crucial decisions renders
them somewhat more difﬁcult to conceive in themind of the individual
for testing purposes.
Kahneman and Tversky elsewhere make reference to the so-called
‘Linda effect’ (Kahneman, 2011, p.158-159; Tversky and Kahneman,
1982, 1983) on individuals who are asked to write descriptive narra-
tives, as they are in scenario planning. They tend to assume that the se-
quence of details and events written into the story combine so as to
increase the probability of the scenario story transpiring (Kahneman,
2011, p.158-159). This is known in the scenario planning literature as
the ‘conjunction fallacy’ (Derbyshire and Wright, 2014, p.217), as asso-
ciated with the ‘simulation heuristic’ (Wright et al., 2013, p.634). The
conjunction fallacy, as evidenced through the Linda effect, can be
viewed as empirically validating Shackle's assertion that it is plausibility
which governs individual decision-making, rather than probability. The
additional details added to the scenario story increase its plausibility in
the minds of decision-makers, even though in reality they reduce its
probability.
Smithson and Ben-Haim (Smithson and Ben-Haim, 2015, p.1912)
note the chronic human tendency to underestimate the likelihood (i.e.
probability) of surprises and show that one reason for this is the so-
called ‘Catch-All Underestimation Bias’ (CAUB), as evidenced by Tversky
and Koehler (Tversky and Koehler, 1994). CAUB suggests that if event
categories are combined under a single super-set then the probability
assigned to the super-set (i.e. the probability of any member of it tran-
spiring) is typically less than the sum of the probabilities assigned to
its constituent categories of event. An example is someone asked to es-
timate the probability of being delayed tomorrow, who then assigns a
lower overall probability to this than the sum of the probabilities they
would individually assign to being late to rise, delayed by trafﬁc, dis-
tracted by meeting someone on the way etc. (Smithson and Ben-
Haim, 2015). The lack of detail associated with the probability assignedPlease cite this article as: Derbyshire, J., Potential surprise theory as a theor
(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.05.008to the super-set leads to an overall underestimation, which is the oppo-
site problem to that in the Linda effect in which detail causes an overes-
timation. In CAUB and the Linda Effect we therefore have empirical
validation of the difﬁculty of using probabilities for thinking about fu-
ture outcomes, which Shackle went to great lengths to emphasise.
5.5. Combining construction and deduction for a scenario planning based
on abduction
Under abductive reasoning, as originally set out by Peirce (Peirce,
1974), decision-making is based on conjectural leaps of the imagination.
PST provides a formalisedmeans for attributing values to plausibility and
impact by eschewing probability and providing a quantitative scale for
plausibility. Yet, at the same time, it fully recognises the subjective and
constructed nature of any consideration of the future, which must inevi-
tably be based on imagination. Yet, it also recognises that the individuals
doing the imagining nevertheless seek to arrive at the best strategy
through a process of deduction, albeit one which is subjective rather
than based on a fully-speciﬁed choice set. A scenario planning
underpinned by PST therefore has the potential to assist in overcoming
the divide between constructionists and deductivists in scenario-
planning research by incorporating imagination and subjectivity, but
also deduction - thereby rendering scenario planning an abductive
means for considering the future, as advocated by Wilkinson
(Wilkinson, 2009).
6. Summary
In this paper we have shown that scenario planning's limited
theoretical underpinning is perceived to affect its use in practice.
Setting out a detailed set of theoretical foundations for scenario
planning can assist in the development of scenario planning as a
practical tool by rendering it more credible and by galvanising the
resources and attention required to empirically test its efﬁcacy, iden-
tifying the approacheswhichwork best in different contexts. This is a
pressing need since recent decades have seen a proliferation of
different methods and approaches, and few, if any, have been empir-
ically tested.
This paper has shown how G. L. S. Shackle's PST is highly congru-
ent with scenario planning. The two contain many similarities,
including the use of plausibility rather than probability, and the
focus on extreme outcomes. The ontologies of the two are in unison
in envisaging the future as constructed through the imaginings of in-
dividuals with the power to choose between different imagined op-
tions. This contrasts with more mainstream decision theory which
views individuals, even under circumstances characterised by funda-
mental uncertainty, as choosing from a fully-speciﬁed choice set
representing all possible outcomes, which are known in advance
and therefore amenable to probabilistic optimisation. Because of
the emphasis on freedom of choice and construction through imagi-
nation, PST places strong emphasis on indeterminism, as does sce-
nario planning. Both see individuals as grappling with fundamental
uncertainties which arise as a result of what Shackle termed ‘crucial
decisions’, as well as stemming from the reﬂexivity associated with
human imagination. Under both, the choice-set of the future is seen
as open and impossible to close. Furthermore, because of its empha-
sis on subjectivity and choice and its view of individuals as con-
structing the future through imagination, yet selecting a best
strategy through a deductive process of comparison and elimination
of imagined options, a scenario planning underpinned by PST can
provide the means to overcome the current divide between con-
structivist and deductivist approaches in scenario planning practice
and scholarship.
The correspondence between PST and scenario planning was
recognised by those working at Shell in the 1970s and 1980s, and by
Shackle himself, who considered them to be in ‘essential unity’. Thatetical foundation for scenario planning, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change
10 J. Derbyshire / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxthis correspondence has remained relatively unexplored is evidence of
the generally atheoretical approach to scenario planning highlighted
in this paper as damaging to its development, and which continues
today, despite some recent progress. It is a considerable oversight
since, as this paper has shown, PST has much to offer as a theoretical
framework for scenario planning. The aim of this paper has been to
begin a debate on the usefulness of PST as an underpinning theoretical
framework, on the foundations of which scenario planning can be
further developed as an academic discipline, lending support to its use
as a practical tool.
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